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VIRGINIA'S EXPERIENCE WITH
THE "UNINSURED MOTORIST ACT"
JOHN M. COURT

I
FOREWORD
This discussion is an attempt to illuminate, for the layman
as well as students of the Law, the social results and practical
operation of a very ingenious legal development in Virginia,
namely the Uninsured Motorist Law. The procedural intricacies of this law, the inadequacy of its tide and the language in
which its related insurance coverage has been defined have
generated considerable confusion as to the mechanics and
scope of the law. A fuller appreciation of this statute might
better have derived from a more felicitous selection of nomenclature, for example had the statute itself been entitled "Highway Security Act", the related coverage called a "self-protection
endorsement" and the fees charged described as "penalties".
As in the case of the Social Security Act, an immediate and
onerous social burden of sizable proportion has been imposed
upon the broadest available economic base of related activity
despite the disinclination of many participants therein to contribute a fair share.
Your author makes no pretense of expertness. A practising attorney of recent vintage, he has been forced to feel out
the numerous facets of this legislation, its method of administration and the legal rationale and commercial practices developed thereunder. These sufficiently aroused his curiosity to
examine further into the ramifications of legislative intent and
insurance theory. His research has resulted in the artidcle here
published. In no sense exhaustive, I it undertakes merely to put
'F or a considerably more technical legal analysis, see Denny, Uninsured
Motorist Coverage in Virginia 47 VA. L.R. 145 (1961). Some of the
ideas there suggested have been confirmed, some rejected by recent court
decisions discussed herein.
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into appropriate perspective the historical, financial, administrative and judicial aspects of this scheme of legislation. Perhaps thereby its comprehension will be enhanced among our
numerous citizens periodically enmeshed in its workings, as insurors or insured, drivers or owners, plaintiffs or defendants,
pedestrians or passengers, repairmen or attending physicians.
All have something significant at stake and in their own interest
each should become aware of the system devised for his respective benefit.
As is frequently the case with recent legislation, a successful
expository discussion of the matter cannot be strictly legal in
the manner of the best appellate briefs. Precedents are incomplete, language is unfamiliar, and experience, rather than
logic, must guide us. Your author, therefore, is more concerned here with the twilight zone of social problems and viable solutions than with the spotlighted legal stage upon which
meticulously prepared summaries are presented for professional
edification.
II.
History of Development of Related Laws
Fair consideration of the laws as to uninsured motorists in
Virginia must also embrace examination of immediately related
statutes in the general scheme of legislation developed in response to the appalling accident rates which accompanied mass
migration on the highways. On one side of the problem are the
State's legal tools for the regulation of the insurance business.
This comprises a long-standing, well-tested, mechanism of
administrative law governing the insurance contracts and
centralized in the State Corporation Commission. On the other
side of the problem is the steadily expanding code of traffic law,
technically a form of criminal law, for the policing and licensing
of motor vehicles, their operators, owners and users. The center
of focus is the field of tort law where the financial responsiblilty
of offenders is of major concern, and much of the income of
the legal profession is derived. Each of these three aspects
deserves equal emphasis in an effective legal system for the
protection of the public on the highways.
The cornerstone of the Virginia scheme for coping with
modern traffic as a social problem was laid in 1944 with the
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adoption of what was rather awkwardly entitled the "Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act". The said Act was the outgrowth of a study initiated in 1942 by a Commission appointed
pursuant to a Joint Resolution of the General Assembly. This
"Commission on Automobile Public Liability and Property
Damage Insurance in Virginia" comprised two members of the
Senate, two of the House, one disinterested layman, a member
of the State Corporation Commission, the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles and a representative of the insurance
business. Its report, 2 [Senate Document #8, 1944,] stated:
An extensive and thorough investigation was made in
an effort to eliminate or suggest remedies for the following
evils:
1. The automobile driver who, while he cannot respond
in damages, continues to drive, although he may have been
involved in numerous accidents, all of which were caused by
his negligence, and who because he is possessed of no
property that may be made available to satisfy a judgment
for damages, is not even sued.
2. The abnormal number of fatal motor vehicle accidents on the highways of this state [over 1,100 fatalities in
19431.
3. The great number of innocent victims of automobile accidents suffering personal injuries or property damages, sometimes both, who have no opportunity to collect
damages for the wrongs they have suffered ... The proposed Act is essentially a safety measure. The Commission
has attempted to avoid placing any additional expense on
the careful driver or on the State. Its purpose has been to
eliminate the chronically reckless and irresponsible driver
from the Highways of the State.
The resultant Act has been periodically amended so as to
comprise at this date a comprehensive system 2 a including: (a)
the centralized reporting and analysis of accidents, (b) the re2

Va. Senate Document No. 8, 1944.

2aVA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-388, 541 (RepL Vol. 1953).
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vocation and suspension of the operators' permits, registration
and license plates of reprehensible parties, (c) a "put-upsecurity or stay-off-the-highway" ultimatum for offenders, (d)
a method of allocating dubious risks to specific insurors, and,
finally, (e) a comprehensively spelled-out coverage requirement in all automobile liability insurance so as to leave minimum loopholes whereby insurors might escape responsibility
for the derelictions of their insured.
Although considerable progress towards improved standards of highway safety was achieved by the State under this
legislation, in 1957 the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council
addressed to the Governor and the General Assembly another
report entitled "The Problem of the Irresponsible Motorist"3
wherein they advocated substantial further state action. In this
report 3 a the Council stated:
In 1944 Virginia adopted the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act which was designed to keep offthehighways
of Virginia motorists who have demonstrated financial irresponsibility by failure to satisfy judgments against them resulting from accidents, thus seeking to avoid further losses
to innocent persons. Experience under this statute has been
excellent as far as it goes. But it does not take care of the
victim of the first accident; it does not apply to out-of-state
motorists except through reciprocity and it does not help
those all too frequent cases in which a completely irresponsible person operates a motor vehicle after his license
to do so has been suspended or revoked.
The Council proceeded to outline the two avenues of approach to this problem which had been tried elsewhere in this
country, the compulsory system of insurance originating in
Massachusetts 4 and the so-called "Unsatisfied Claim and
Judgment Fund" plan developed in NewJersey. 5 Of these two
3

Virginia Advisory Legislative Council Report of November 14, 1957, to
Honorable Thomas B. Stanley, Governor of Virginia and the General
Assembly of Virginia.

3a Id. at 5.
4 MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 90, § 34 A-J and Ch. 175 § 113 A-G (1954).
See similar provisions N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309, 319 (1953).
5 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-61, 91 (1961). See similar provisions in MD.
ANN. CODE Art. 66V § 150-79 (1957).
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methods the Council recommended the latter non-compulsory
arrangement, but their proposed bil to put this plan into
effect appeared so forbiddingly complex and replete with
administrative and judicial ramifications that it was of doubtful
efficacy from the victim's standpoint of promptness of recovery
and breadth of coverage. To the apparent consternation of
substantial insurance interests, the Assembly in its wisdom
turned its back on the drafted bill and struck out boldly with -a
much simpler plan. Their substitute v greatly reduced the
governmental red tape to be encountered by the victim in his
actual recovery of losses suffered in the form of property
damage or bodily injury caused by unknown or uninsured
operators.
The Members of the Assembly patterned their approach to
this thorny dilemma around the existing system already in
effective operation as result of the 1944 legislation. The relative importance of fiscal precision and of personal security on
the highway were duly considered. The Assembly's solution
reasonably emphasized the latter.
Under the Act adopted in 1958, special registration fees were
established for all who undertook to license their vehicles in
this state without evidence of satisfactory liability insurance or
other proof of financial responsiblilty. In part, the funds
derived from this collection were to be used to administer the
program called for by the Act; the balance was to be used to
defray, in part, the cost to other car registrants of the newly
mandatory clause in liability insurance required in the State.
The net available after the payment of administrative costs was
to be disbursed annually among the insurers in proportion to
their net premium income attributed to this particular risk.
Rates charged by insurers would be controlled in anticipation
of this subsidy in the usual manner by the Corporation Commission upon a showing of actuarial experience. Theoretically,
at the outset at least, it was anticipated that the extra license fee
contribution of uninsured registrants would substantially pay
for the initial risk of loss generated by financially irresponsible
motorists. For various reasons this anticipation has proven
6 Va. Advisory Legislative Council Report Nov. 14, 1957, pp. 12 through 21.
7 Acts of Assembly, 1958, p. 336, Ch. 282.
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ill-founded although the core of actuarial problem may be more
statistical than real.
The administrative leverage for the restriction of uninsured
operators, upon their becoming party to any "reportable"
accident, was strengthened so as to impel all but the most rash
and unknowing motorists into the ranks of the insured. It is
hardly surprising that the ratio of insured drivers to uninsured
grew rapidly when this legislation took effect. 8 An obvious
side effect of this tilt to the ratio was that while the "kitty"
shrank, the number of claimants and the size of claims grew.
As knowledge of the existence of the new resources on tap to
injured parties became general, there developed a substantial
increase in the cost of underwriting such insurance. This has
caused much anguish among the insurers who have returned
annually to the State Corporation Commission with pleas for
higher rates for the uninsured endorsement.
The initial rate for the added risk, established by the State
Corporation Commission, was based on rather conservative
estimates and amounted to $6.00 per car per annum. This
proved a great bonanza to the insurance companies so that
after eighteen months operation the rate was reduced to $1.00. ,
During this period the insurers are reported to have had an income of $7,000,000 in premiums and distributions as against
approximately $350,000 in actual losses from this coverage. 1o
The new $1.00 rate remained in effect approximately two years.
Several attempts by the insurers to raise it in the period were
rejected by the Commission. Finally however, on January 15,
1962, the rate was raised back to $3.00.11 By this time the
8 This statement is based on data furnished the author by the Director of
the Bureau of Safety Responsibility, Division of Motor Vehicles, and
has been corroborated in consultation with members of the Assembly
who have participated in Committee work on this legislative area.
Comparative statistics prior to 1 July, 1958 are not available except by
estimate. The tables illustrate the situation since the law became effective;
see Appendices "C" and "D".
9 State Corporation Commission, Case No. 14585 (9 November, 1959).
10 The number of policies issued insured motorists in Virginia at this period

was approximately 1,300,000; the distribution made by the SCC totaled
approximately $1,000,000. The data as to losses was presented in hearings
on establishment of rates. The discrepancy between actual losses and
anticipated losses was due perhaps to the complexity of litigation.
11 State Corporation Commission, Case No. 15521 (1 December, 1961).
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relative number of uninsured registrants had decreased from
38% to 7% of the total registration.12
Many complaints have been voiced to legislators about the
unfairness of forcing insured motorists to pay for the negligence or improvidence of the uninsured through their insurance
premiums. This misconception was widespread. Actually the
uninsured driver who paid the extra registration fee acquired
nothing but the privilege of driving until he had an accident.
He was entirely unprotected in the event of his own injury at
the hands of another uninsured and in the event of collision he
was subject to subrogation claims for any adverse judgment as
well as loss of his license and operator's permit unless he was
promptly vindicated.
It is interesting to note that the only amendment adopted to
the Uninsured Motorist Law at the 1962 session of the General
Assembly was a revision in the rate establishment procedure
such that in the future the charge for this coverage will not be
separately identified in the premium nor in the rate adjustment
proceeding before the State Corporation Commission. 13 This
is expected to softpedal the complaints of both insurers and
insured. Many other revisions were offered but were rejected
in favor of the status quo. It would appear therefore that a modus
vivendi has been arrived at. This degree of stabilization having
been achieved it appears appropriate at this stage to take note
how the law is having its effect.
III.
Provisionsof the Code Related to the Problem of the Uninsured
Motorist
As we noted earlier the Virginia Assembly has consistently
rejected the idea of compulsory liability insurance and established instead in 1958 a voluntary system which undertakes to
encourage the use of such insurance by a scheme of rewards for
those who comply and a scheme of penalties for those who do
not. That this approach has had a fair measure of success is
12 Letter from Honorable E. E. Lane to author, 19 April, 1962.
23See Appendix "B" for full text of the Act of March 14, 1962 (Ch. 253

(S249)).
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attested by the fact that whereas in 1957 only about 60% of the
parties to reportable accidents were insured, by 1961 the ratio
had levelled off at about 89% 14. Out of each eleven uninsured
autos involved in accidents reported to the Division of Motor
registration fees properly as
Vehicles in 1961, seven had paid
"uninsured" but four had not. 15 These latter four were, in the
expression of the Director of Safety Responsibility, "chiselers"
who either had falsely certified their insurance or had allowed
their policies to lapse prior to the accident. Out-of-state
motorists not subject to the requirement are not included in
the above classifications. The author understands these data
to have so stabilized over the last two years that the vigor of
enforcement cannot be expected to reduce substantially further
the ratio of "chiselers".
With this background information let us examine the
various provisions of the code which have been enacted to
effect this scheme of rewards and penalties, and of obligations
and privileges. These provisions fall into four groups as follows:
(a) Those provisions establishing certain mandatory
insurance clauses included by statute in all automobile
liability insurance issued on vehicles principally garaged or
used in the State and prescribing special procedures for
recovery of losses resulting from torts involving use of
vehicles in this State.
(b) Those provisions dealing with the administration
of the registration system to assure enforcement of fee
requirements on uninsured motorists prior to their involvement in any accident.
(c) Those provisions dealing with the policing of uninsured motorists after their involvement in any accident.
(d) Those provisions dealing with the administration
of the Uninsured Motorist Fund by the State Corporation
Commission and the adjustment of related insurance rates.
14 See table II in Appendix "D" on Accident data furnished by Division of

Motor Vehicles. The 60% figure is an estimate since no actual figures
are available prior to the effective date of UML.
15 See Appendix "C" for detailed data.
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Let us begin our discussion of these code provisions with
those in group (a) above.
The statute generally identified as the Uninsured Motorist
Law is embraced now in the Virginia Code of 1950, as amended,
in Tide 38.1 "Insurance", Article 4 "Liability Insurance Policies". Section 381 of this tide contains, as subparagraph (a),
the familiar omnibus clause adopted in 1944 requiring that any
liability insurance policy delivered by licensed insurers of this
state to the owner of any vehicle principally garaged or used
here shall extend coverage under the policy to any operation of
the insured vehicle undertaken with the owner's consent,
express or implied. The other subparagraphs, (b) through (g)
of this code section, are derived from the 1958 Act of Assembly' 6and spell out the protection which must be extended for
the recovery of damages incurred by the non-cooperative 10%
of the parties to accidents, "uninsured".
Subparagraph (b), the key clause, requires that such policies
contain the self-protective feature whereby the insurer undertakes to pay the insured any sum, within specified limits, which
said insured may become entitled to recover as result of a civil
action against an unknown or uninsured motorist.
Subparagraph (c) defines the term "insured" very broadly
so as to include not only the named insured and spouse but
relatives of either residing in the same household and anyone
using the vehicle, or guest in, the vehicle under the omnibus
clause. This subparagraph further defines "uninsured" to indude operators without coverage, those denied coverage and
the unknown, but excludes the self-insured and the bonded.
Importantly also it subjects recovery under the endorsement to
the terms of the statute.
Subparagraphs (d) and (e)1 7are concerned with John Doe
actions against unknown participants in an accident. Pro16 Acts of Assembly 1958, p. 336, Ch. 282, minor amendments were added
in 1959 and 1960. Of these the most significant is Acts of Assembly 1962,
Ch. 457, § 1(e) (1). For full text see Appendix "A".
27 Subparagraph e(1) appears to apply to both John Doe actions and actions
against known uninsured.
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cedures are established whereby insurers are properly put on
notice to defend such suits pending identification of the proper
defendant and certain privileges are permitted in the defense.
This area has proven the most litigated part of the statute from
the standpoint of appeals as the subsequent sections of this
discussion will disclose.
Subparagraph (f) simply extends the right of subrogation
to the insurer wherever he is called upon under the above
clauses to pay a judgment claim to his own insured.
Subparagraph (g) prevents the "fine print" of the contract
of insurance from defeating the intent of the law: (h) makes a
special exception for employers covered by workmen's compensation policies.
We come now to the statutory provisions in the second
group, the initial restrictions on uninsured drivers. Title 46.1
"Motor Vehicles" sections 46.1-167.1 to 167.6 set forth the
mechanics for establishing the Uninsured Motorist Fund. Section 46.1-167.1 establishes the extra $10 (total $20) registration
fee for uninsured drivers and authorizes the Commissioner at
his discretion to demand a certificate of insurance from applicants who declare themselves to be eligible for the "insured"
registration fee of $10. Section 46.1-167.3 establishes special
penalties for those who permit their insurance to lapse and fail
to pay the uninsured motorist fee. These penalties include a
six month suspension of operator's license and registration
certificate. Thereafter upon presentation of the $20 fee together with a certificate of financial responsibility the Commissioner may restore driving privileges. It should be here
noted that there is a distinction between the certificate of insurance and the certificate of financial responsibility. The one
assures merely that insurance complying with State requirements was effective as of a given date. The certificate of
financial responsibility, however, assures that satisfactory insurance or bond has been established for the full duration of the
registration. It should be further noted that where suspension is
in effect for violation of the statute it may remain effective up to
five years if proof of financial responsibility is not forthcoming.
In Section 46.1-167.4 there is provided a revocation of
operator's license and an additional penalty of $75 upon the
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operators of uninsured vehicles subject to State registration
who have failed to maintain insurance, failed to pay the uninsured motorist fee and subsequently became involved in a
reportable collision in this State. This penalty applies regardless whether civil or criminal liability in the accident is proven.
The mere fact of the accident and the occurrence of damages
trigger the penalty. This fine or fee also applies where resident
operators of out-of-state vehicles, not properly insured by
State law, become similarly involved in collisions. Section 46.1167.5 provides further suspension penalties where the additional proof of financial responsibility called for by the section
is not forthcoming.
As will be noted the provisions of the code for the control
of uninsured vehicles priorto any reportable accident in which
their operator may be involved, designated as group (b) above,
and those applying after such an event, designated as group (c)
above, tend to overlap. The emphasis in the one case is on the
collection of the fees for, and the integrity of, the Uninsured
Motorist Fund; the emphasis in the latter situation is on the
careful policing of accident-prone operators. The effect of the
two groups of penalties is cumulative.
By code provisions 46.1-449, 442, and 443, the group (c)
penalties are set forth. Under this part of the Code uninsured
motorists who have paid their $20 uninsured registration fees
and who become involved in a reportable accident, regardless
of the establishment of any civil or criminal liability on the part
of the uninsured operator, are subjected to suspension of
operator's license and registration certificate pending the
posting of security for possible claims based upon the reported
accident.
Section 46.1-442 provides further suspension
penalties against uninsured operators who become defendants
with unsatisfied civil judgments of thirty days record. To make
this provision effective such judgments are required to be reported to the Division of Motor Vehicles by the Clerk of the
Court in which the judgment is rendered. By section 46.1-443
similar penalties are made applicable where out-of-state judgments against Virginia operators remain unsatisfied a similar
period and are reported to the Division.
The final group of Code provisions, (d) above, comprise a
portion of Title 12 "State Corporation Commission". Sections
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12-65, 12-66, and 12-67 govern the administration of the Uninsured Motorist Fund by the State Corporation Commission.
By the amendment adopted 14 March 196218 the Assembly
coordinated the language of these sections with that of sections
38.1-21 and 38.1-252 so as to redefine the definition of liability
insurance coverage and the rate-controlling function of the
Corporation Commission. By this means they have eliminated
the separate consideration of the "Uninsured" Endorsement
premium. 18. It now becomes part of the overall liability
coverage for purposes of financial analysis. The policy of the
Commission, until now, has been to disburse all the annual
accumulation of fees each year among the insurers after payment of the administration expenses for the plan in the Division
of Motor Vehicles and in the Corporation Commission itself.
It is patent from the above pattern of statutes that both the
penalties of non-insurance and the close restriction of accidentprone operators effectively increase the security of the average
motorist in the State. Further the exceptional breadth of
coverage of the mandatory endorsements should be noted. The
uninsured sector of the Virginia population, as to injuries from
vehicular accidents, is probably smaller than in virtually any
other state. Contractually and on a voluntary basis the Virginia
system protects its residents to the $15,000 bodily injury limit
both in and out of state, and as driver, passenger or pedestrian,
provided only that the injured be a member of the same household, guest or baillee of an insured, and provided further that
the victim is not himself guilty of the negligence which was the
proximate cause of the accident.
Precise figures are not available to illustrate the overall
effectiveness of the Virginia system but it may be noted that in
1961 the accident fatality rate on her highways was a substantial 20% lower than it had been eighteen years before despite
a traffic load in the order of three times greater. There can be
no doubt that the order of reduction in the financial distress
created by the accident rate is even more substantial. It is a
Is Supra note 13.
18

aIt should be noted that all reference to making the Uninsured Motorist

Fund defray the cost of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement has now
been stricken from 12-66.
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highly commendable accomplishment attributable, in large
measure, to the wisdom of the legal system devised to achieve
it.
The controversies which have arisen regarding the above
group of statutes have concerned primarily two irritants to the
insurance interests. First of these is the rate-making policy of
the Corporation Commission which we have discussed above.
The other is the scope of contractual responsibility assumed
under the Uninsured Endorsement. This we shall amplify
below.

IV.
The Tort Phase of Litigation
The issues in litigation carried to the appellate level, involving interpretation of the foregoing legislation, can be
fairly cleanly divided into those in the tort phase and those in
contract phase. As Professor Arthur Phelps states in his "Handbook of Virginia Rules df Procedurein Actions at Law",' 0 "Causes
of action in tort cannot be joined with causes of action in contract according to the classic rule which has been followed in
Virginia for some years. This rule leads to much injustice under
modern rules of pleading." Although there are indications that
adherence to this rule is wavering, the reasons for the rule are
perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the "John Doe"
cases which have come to the Court of Appeals.
As of this writing2o appeals have been allowed in four
cases involving the fictitious John Doe. Three of these cases
were ruled on by the Appeals Court on 23 April 1962, the fourth
is pending. A review of these cases is helpful at this stage in
order to untangle the confusion as to procedural requirements.
Fundamentally, as in the proverbial recipe for rabbit stew,
the first step is to catch the rabbit. In other words the tort
liability of the unknown tortfeasor must be established at law
before the contractual and statutory obligations under the
endorsement can be properly considered. The reasons become
19 Michie, Charlottesville, p. 142 (1959).
2

0 May, 1962.
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amply dear from a brief study of cases discussed below. 21 In
the first of these, the Brown Case, the multiplicity of issues
tends to obscure the true holding. The other two decided
cases, those of Mangus and Faulkner, hinged on very narrow
points. In the one, a definition of "unknown" was put in
issue; in the other, the necessity for corroboration at the tort
phase. It should be kept in mind that in none of these cases has
final judgment been rendered againstthe plaintiffs insurer. The
contract liability aspect is separately analyzed in the subsequent
section of this discussion.
The case of John Doe vs. T. P. Brown came on appeal from
the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg. Plaintiff Brown, a
guest in an insured vehicle there won a $14,000 personal injury
verdict against Doe in the Trial Court. The facts of the case
were that the car in which Brown was riding, driven by a party
named Grubbs, struck a parked car about midnight on a hilly
street in the City of Lynchburg. In the collision Brown sustained a head injury which resulted in spells of dizziness, interfering with his employment. Grubbs was convicted of reckless
driving in the Traffic Court. Grubbs attributed the accident to
his having had to swerve to avoid collision with the glaring
headlights of an unknown vehicle coming in the opposite direction and in the wrong lane. It appeared from the testimony
that, after its collision with the parked car, the car in which
Brown was passenger continued to drive around for an appreciable period and later returned to the scene of the accident
where the police had arrived to investigate the complaint of the
owner of the parked car. No report of the accident was ever
filed with the Division of Motor Vehicles by either Grubbs or
Brown. Suit was brought by Brown against Grubbs and John
Doe. The jury foundfor Grubbs and againstDoe and assessed
$14,000 damages. Subsequent to the trial, a new witness to the
disputed events was discovered by Doe's attorneys. This witness asserted that there had been no other car involved and that
Grubbs was not the driver of the car at the time of the accident.
Further it had developed during the trial that plaintiff Brown
21

These cases, in the order in which they are here discussed, are as follows:
a) John Doe v. Thomas Preston Brown, Rec. No. 5405 203 Va.-(1962).
b) Arthur J. Mangus v. John Doe, Rec. No. 5386 203 Va.-(1962).
c) John Doe v. Robert Faulkner, Rec. No. 5388 203 Va.-(1962).
d) Dorothy Hodgson v. John Doe, Rec. No. 5502-Va.-(1962).
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had been several times convicted of forgery, had spent most of
his time in the penitentiary in recent years, and was a frequent
participant in brawls wherein he had sustained head injuries.
Suit had not been brought until fourteen months after the accident and that Code provision requiring notice to the Department of Motor Vehicles had not been complied with. Counsel
for Doe therefore moved for a retrial on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence and excessive verdict. The Trial Court
denied the motion for retrial, whereupon Doe filed an appeal
based primarily upon these grounds, as to the Uninsured Motorist Law:
(a) The constitutionality of the John Doe statute was
challenged for its failure to provide due process upon Doe
under the 14th Amendment. It was argued that, absent a
requirement for proceeding by Order of Publication against
Doe, there could be no proper process as regards the unknown defendant. Further, under article 52 of the State
Constitution, it was complained that the procedural aspects
incorporated in Title 38.1 of the Code properly should have
been placed in Title 8 of the Code, hence the Uninsured
Motorist Law was in violation of the said article of the Virginia Constitution, which requires each act of legislation to
treat but a single subject.
(b) It was further argued that the failure to file the five
day accident report which the statute required if the "insured" (meaning plaintiff Brown as guest in an insured
automobile) intended to recover under the endorsement
defeated plaintiff's rights under the statute. The Trial
Court had overruled these contentions, originally set forth
in the defense demurrer, on the ground that whereas they
might constitute a bar to an action directly against the
Company in contract, they were not a bar in the action
against John Doe to establish legal liability in tort. This
raised a technical question of whether the John Doe theory
of action was ex contractu or ex delicto. Here lay the crux of
the case.
(c) The liability insurance contract endorsement, as
approved by the State Corporation Commission, defined as
"uninsured" only those unknown "hit and run" drivers who
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had caused impact between the vehicles, for purposes of
coverage under the policy. The appellant therefore argued
that since the General Assembly, in full knowledge of this
endorsement, approved by the Commission had not seen
fit to prohibit such a requirement, it should be considered
a valid restriction under the statute.
In ruling upon the appeal the Court, Judge I'Anson writing
the opinion, found no merit in the appellant's objections. The
Constitutional issues were summarily dealt with. The Court
explained that this action was against a legal fiction, Doe, who
for the purposes of the statute was represented by the insurer
of the plaintiff. Since service was had on the representative of
the insurer, there was no necessity for service by publication on
the fictitious party.
Said the Court:
. .. a State, under its exercise of police power, may adopt
a statute providing for constructive service of process on
a non-resident causing injuries on the highways and there
is no denial of 'due process of law' if it contains reasonable
provision for notice to the defendant and affords him
reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The defendant John Doe is a fictitious person created
under the provisions of the statute to stand in the place of
the unknown motorist. John Doe is not a person but for
the purpose of this proceeding speaks through the Insurance
Company. Since John Doe is afforded the opportunity to
defend the action through the Insurance Company he has
not been denied due process of law.
As to the confusion of title the Court pointed out that there
was no deception in the name of the Act; that as is frequently
the case, a general tide was adopted which properly should put
the parties on notice of the need to examine the legislation in
greater detail, and that it patently was impossible to include
every aspect of the legislation in the title without making the
tide as long as the act itself.
The basic rationale of the Court's position on the procedural
points was that the John Doe action was fundamentally an
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action ex delicto rather than ex contractu. Its function was to
establish the legal liability of the unknown party and to establish the liquidated damages for future reference. The Court
expressly stated that the judgment rendered was not a judgment
against the insurer. This is a matter of separate litigation ex
contractu. Thus, in effect the plaintiff, having been rendered a
favorable verdict as to the unknown driver, is now in a position
to negotiate with the insurer or to sue the insurer if the negotiation is not satisfactory.
Accordingly the issues of notice to the Director of Motor
Vehicles under the statute or notice to the insurer under the
contract were irrelevant to the problem of tort liability. Presumably they would not be irrelevant in the case of suit on the
contract against the insurer.
As can be seen from the above line of reasoning the matter of
contact between vehicles, as required under the contract endorsement, is also moot in this case. All in all, it becomes
apparent, by its logical segregation of the tort action from the
contract action, that the Court has adhered to the tradition of
Virginia Law and has made future litigation under the Act
considerably more understandable, although it would appear to
become more difficult for the plaintiff to obtain the actual
recovery since frequently the plaintiff will have to win two
actions one in tort and one in contract to obtain an effective
recovery.
The case of ArthurJ. Mangus vs.John Doe,2 et al, came on
appeal from the Court of Law & Chancery of the City of Norfolk. The facts were as follows: On 3 August 1960 plaintiff
Mangus, driving his own vehicle unaccompanied, had halted
for a red light at a Norfolk intersection. The John Doe automobile bumped him slightly in the rear while Mangus waited
for the light to change. Both parties got out of their automobiles and discussed and inspected the damage. Since the damage was exceedingly slight, there was no exchange of identification, of insurance data or of license tag numbers and no report
was made of the accident to the Division of Motor Vehicles.
Mangus made no notification of the accident to his insurer,
22

Supra note 21.
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United States Casualty Company, as required by his policy
endorsement regarding claims.
In November, 1960, plaintiff Mangus, who had a long
history of arthritis, suffered aggrevated arthritic pains and was
found to require surgery for ruptured disc in his spine. In
December, 1960, plaintiff brought the above suit. Copy of his
Motion for Judgment was served upon the registered agent of
the United States Casualty Company whose counsel, acting on
behalf of defendant, moved to dismiss and/or quash process.
The Trial Court held that the clause in the policy requiring
notice to the insurer was in conflict with Va. Code 38.1-381 (d)
and therefore the clause was void, but stated that the failure of
the plaintiff to file report of the accident to the Division of
Motor Vehicles within five days after the accident "unless
insured was reasonably unable to do so" was a condition
precedent to the cause of action and must be asserted and
proven by the plaintiff. The Trial Court stated further:
Certainly the purpose of the Act is to protect those using
the highways of this Commonwealth from the negligence of
operators carrying no liability insurance. In the instant
case, while the operator was unknown, he is unknown only
because the plaintiff himself failed to ascertain his identity,
which according to his own testimony was readily available
by the exercise of due diligence. Therefore, without the
necessity of passing upon the question of whether or not
the plaintiff complied with Section 38.1 381(d) requiring
notice to the Division of Motor Vehicles as soon as reasonably practicable under the circumstances, the Court is of the
opinion that the plaintiff cannot maintain his action under
the provisions of the aforementioned statutes and that the
defendant's motion to dismiss and/or quash process against
the United States Casualty Company, should be sustained.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for consideration on the merits of the tort issue. Judge I'Anson's opinion,
adhering to its line of reasoning in the Brown case above, found
that the tort issue of legal liability required resolution before
the contract issues were to be considered. The Court pointed
out that the term "unknown" as used in the statute had no
qualifications about the use of due diligence to determine the
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identity of the party. Obviously it will normally behoove the
participant in a collision to fully identify any other participants
but the fact that he has failed or been unable to do so should
have no bearing on the legal liability for damages-it merely
makes more difficult the subsequent problem of recovering
liquidated damages.
The case of John Doe vs. Robert Faulkner23 involved the
single issue of corroboration. The case came to the Supreme
Court of Appeals from the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk,
where Faulkner had a judgment for two thousand dollars.
The facts were that the defendant Faulkner, driving unaccompanied, collided with a telephone pole at the traffic circle at
the intersection of Tidewater Drive and Brambleton Avenue in
Norfolk about 5:30 a.m., on a wet street. His automobile had a
history of steering difficulty. Faulkner's own account to the
investigating officer indicated he had been exceeding the speed
limit although his testimony at the trial deniedthis. He attributed his loss of control of his automobile and the resultant collision with the pole, however, entirely to the negligent operation of a John Doe vehicle which had entered the traffic circle
from a feeder lane against the traffic light. Faulkner testified
that John Doe by negligent operation of his vehicle caused
Faulkner to maneuver violently to avoid collision, whereupon
the steering gear of his vehicle froze in an extreme position,
which in turn caused his vehicle to strike the telephone pole.
Upon the conclusion of Faulkner's case in the Trial Court,
attorneys for Doe moved to strike Faulkner's evidence. This
motion was overruled and a verdict of $2,000 was returned for
Faulkner, whereupon Doe's attorneys sued for a writ of error to
the Supreme Court of Appeals on the following argument:
(a) The fictitious defendantJohn Doe, being incapable
of testifying, was encompassed by the terms of Code
Section 8-286, "The Dead Man's Statute."
(b) By the specific provision of 8-286 no judgment may
be rendered solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a
party at interest where the defendant is incapable of testifying in his own behalf.
23

Ibid.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

3:237

(c) In view of the above their motion to strike should
have been sustained.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Trial Court's judgment and,
Judge I'Anson again writing the opinion, pointed out the wellestablished function of Code Section 8-286, as set forth in
Robertson vs. Atlantic Realty, 2 4 wherein it was said:
The purpose of the section (formerly #6209, now
8-286) was to remove disqualifications, not to create them
in any case, nor to impose burdens on witnesses already
competent.
The Court in the Faulkner case went on to say:
... The operator of the John Doe automobile is unavailable because his identity is unknown. The word
unavailableis not synonymous with the word incapableused
in the statute. A witness may be unavailable for various
reasons but he is not incapable simply because he is unavailable.
Another John Doe case arising out of the UML is now
pending in the Supreme Court of Appeals which involves a new
issue as to its scope. In the Corporation Court for the City of
Bristol the defendant's demurrer was sustained in the case of
Dorothy Hodgson vs. John Doe25 because the Virginia insured
failed to report to the Division of Motor Vehicles a hit and
run accident in Tennessee of which she was victim. The
plaintiff has now appealed on the issue of whether her failure to
promptly report the accident is a fatal defect in the tort claim
against an unknown hit and run driver, where the plaintiff, a
Virginia registrant, resident and insured, seeks to recover under
the Virginia Uninsured Motorist Law. It would appear to the
author here that since Virginia procedural traffic law is not
applicable in Tennessee, the tort issue could be considered on
its merits in the Virginia Courts and that thereafter the contract
issue should be resolved subject to Virginia procedural requirements.
24

129 Va. 494, 106 S.E. 521 (1921).

25 Supra note 21.
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V.
The Contract Phase of Litigation
As must now be apparent, the Court decisions as to establishment of tort liability strongly tend to liberalize consideration of issue of negligence on the part of an unknown party to
an accident on Virginia highways or streets. In simple terms
the purpose of the Uninsured Motorist Act has been interpreted
to put the claimant against John Doe in equally as accessible a
position to prove the fictitious Doe's legal liability as if Doe
were a known party subject to the jurisdiction of the Court and
duly served with process. As to contract liability, however, the
decisions to date have been considerably less liberal. Here the
action appears subject to certain conditions precedent and to
certain procedural requirements as well as to the conventional
rules and special statutory obligations of insurance contracts.
To date the cases which directly bear on the contract aspect of
the Uninsured Motorist Law are three. 26 We undertake to
review the salient points of these since they emphatically underscore the entirely different attitudes in which actions ex contractu and ex delicto are analyzed by the Court.
In Creteau vs. Phoenix Assurance Company,27 plaintiff Creteau, a guest in a car in collision with an uninsured motorist had
previously obtained a $5,000 judgment against the said uninsured motorist which judgment had proven uncollectible.
Plaintiff had acted to obtain service upon the insurer of his
host's vehicle at the time suit was brought against the uninsured motorist but the Clerk of Court had, for undisclosed
reasons, refused to issue the summons. Thereupon plaintiff put
insurer on actual notice of the suit, as required by the contract,
and insurer had had counsel present at the trial. The policy
sued on, in this case against Phoenix, had been delivered prior
to the enactment of Va. Code 38.1-381 (e)(1) which calls for
26

These cases in the order in which they are here discussed are
a) Creteau v. Phoenix Assurance Company, 202 Va. 641,
336 (1961).
b) State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v. Charles
Rec. No. 5391, 203 Va.-(1962).
c) Horne v. Superior Life Insurance Co., 203 Va. 282, 124
(1962).

27 Supra note 26.
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service of process upon the insurer if coverage required by the
act is to be relied upon. The accident occurred after this
amendment had become effective. The defendant insurer
demurred on the ground that the law superceded the terms of
the policy and that the insurer had not waived his rights under
the law. The Trial Court held for Creteau on the ground that
the amendment could not change the contract. Judge I'Anson,
in rendering the opinion of the Supreme Court, reversed and
upheld the insurer's demurrer asserting that the amendment to
the law, being of a procedural nature, had not deprived the
plaintiff of any substantive rights under his contract of insurance. It was simply a condition precedent to suit under the
endorsement. Further, said the Court, the insurer by his conduct, nonparticipation in spite of actual notice,28 had not
waived service of process. The failure of plaintiff to attach
copy of his previous pleadings, in his suit against Phoenix,
prevented the Court from considering whether the Clerk had
been in error in refusing to issue summons to the insurer.
Therefore the Court could only assume that the Clerk had been
justified on the face of the pleadings in making such refusal.
Under these circumstances there had been no waiver of rights,
since waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right and will not be implied "except upon dear and unmistakable proof of intention to waive such rights" 29
The sole issue involved in the case of State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Company vs. Charles F. Duncanso was
whether, under current law, a plaintiff who had obtained judgment against a known uninsured motorist may recover under
the terms of his own contract with the insurer despite his
failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the
statute which are more favorable to the insurer and which
antedated the policy in its effective date. The facts here were
that Duncan had recovered a judgment of $8,000 for personal
injury in a suit against a named driver (apparently from out-ofstate) who failed to make an appearance in his own defense.
Duncan had sent copy of the motion and judgment against
28 The insurer's counsel merely observed and did not make an appearance
to plead the case for the named and known uninsured.

29 Quoted in the opinion, from 19 MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE, Waiver,
2, (1950).
30 Supra note 26.
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the truck driver to his insurer in accordance with the notice
requirement of the insurance contract and had further kept
his insurer informed of all facts and proceedings as required
by his policy. Insurer admitted, by stipulation, that he had
received all of the informal notification but asserted that the
failure of the defendant, Duncan, to comply with statute as to
service of process defeated Duncan's claim under the policy.
State Farm supported its contention with the Creteau case,
supra. Duncan undertook to distinguish Creteau on the contendon that the insurer here had offered the policy after the
effective date of the act and in full knowledge thereof whereas
in Creteau the act had superceded the terms of the policy. The
Trial Court held for Duncan on this ground.
The Court of Appeals, Chief Justice Eggleston writing the
opinion, reversed the Trial Court judgment and gave final
judgment for the Insurer. In a very closely reasoned explanation for this action, it was pointed out that the notice
requirement of the contract and the process requirement of
the statute were not for the same purpose and were not substitutes one for the other. The notice alerted the insurer (1) to
the existence of subrogation rights against the uninsured and
also (2) to the possibility of a legal liability. By the statute
the insurer is given the opportunity, when served with process,
to intervene and defend under the contract in its own name,
or to defend solely in the name of John Doe on the tort
claim. Accordingly, adhering basically to its reasoning in the
Creteau case, the Court held that the statutory requirements
were indispensable to establishing the legal liability of the
insurer. The Court said, referring to the negotiations which
preceded the suit and which the claimant Duncan asserted
estopped the insurer from using the statute as a defense, "We
have been pointed to no principle of law, nor do we know of any
which requires a party during negotiations for settlement of a
controversy with his adversary, to notify his adversary that
should the negotiations fail and litigation follow he will rely
upon any particular defense which may be available to him."
Accordingly the Court held that the insurer had waived
none of its statutory rights and gave final judgment for the
insurer on the contract.
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The case of Home vs. Superior Life Insurance Company31,
involved an interesting peripheral issue as to the Uninsured
Motorist Law although the basic controversy arose from a
denial of Workmen's Compensation by the Industrial Commission. The facts were that Home, an employee of the said
Insurance Company, was seriously injured in a collision while a
passenger in his wife's car. At the time of the accident he
was engaged in his employment. His injury, involving amputation of his leg, appeared to be the fault of an uninsured
motorist. Home's wife's vehicle was insured by Aetna, and
the policy contained the required Uninsured Motorist endorsement. Home sued the uninsured driver in whose behalf
Aetna made an out-of-court settlement of $13,000 with Home
whereby, without reference to Home's employer, Superior,
Home gave Aetna a release of his claims under the Uninsured
Motorist Law and agreed to hold for Aetna's benefit any
claims he had against others as result of the accident. Home
further agreed to claim Workmen's Compensation and to
divide equally with Aetna the net proceeds which he was
entitled to on such a claim.
At this juncture the Industrial Commission denied Horne's
claim for Workmen's Compensation because Home by his
action had destroyed his employer's right of subrogation
against Aetna and because he had already enjoyed one full
recovery under the Act.
In reversing and remanding the Industrial Commission's
decision the distinction between tort and contract rights was
emphasized by the Supreme Court of Appeals, Said the Court:
. . . Aetna's liability to its insured is contractual even
though it is based upon the contingency of a third party's
tort liability and Home's employer, Superior, does not
become a third party beneficiary under the insurance contract. In fact the policy specifically provided that it was
not to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any
Workmen's Compensation Carrier or self insurer under the
Act (Va. Code 65-38). Mrs. Home had chosen to provide,
at her expense, additional protection under the uninsured
31 Ibid.
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motorist provision for herself and others protected thereby
and not for Superior or its Compensation Carrier.
Further said the Court:
Since Superior was subrogated to no rights against
Aetna, Home has not prejudiced or destroyed any rights
of Superior by releasing Aetna from liability on its policy.
The Court found Home's agreement to divide the proceeds of
his Workmen's Compensation claim void as a matter of law
but did say with regard to the tort liability,
When we consider public policy and welfare aspects of the
Workmen's Compensation Act we reach the conclusion
that the General Assembly did not intend, by enacting the
Uninsured Motorist Law, to abrogate the right of subrogation conferred by it in the Workmen's Compensation Act,
nor did it intend to deprive the employer, or its Compensation Carrier, of its primary right of Subrogation to the proceeds of any recovery had from the negligent third party.
Thus we hold that the employer's right of subrogation
against the negligent third party is superior to that of the
insurer under the Uninsured Motorist Law.
To summarize, the law intended that Home have two separate sources of compensation but Aetna's bargained rights in
settling the policy claim were subordinate to the statutory
rights established by the Workmen's Compensation Law, both
as to employer and employee. Hence Superior was subrogated
to the claim against the uninsured driver but not to Home's
settlement with Aetna, and Aetna was cut out, both of its
subrogation against uninsured and its bargain with Horne for
half of his Workmen's Compensation proceeds.
VI.

Summary and Conclusion
We have traced, in a perhaps disjointed manner, the available record of the Uninsured Motorist Law in Virginia, its
origin, its associated laws, its effect, and its interpretation.
Those concerned with the operation of only one aspect of the
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system, of which this statute forms an essential part, tend to
criticize without a full appreciation of the scope of the problem
it attempts to resolve or of the relative importance of the various
measures which may be made of the program's success. We
have attempted to place the rationale of the law and its practical
results in a fair overall perspective without undue emphasis on
the problems confronting any one group of parties affected by
its operations.
The Virginia tradition of emphasis on the voluntary rather
than the compulsory should be noted; also her preference for
the pay-as-you-go plan rather than a redistribution of wealth
and for private enterprise rather than the governmental bureaus.
There is also discernible in the cases reviewed the strong
flavor of common-law pleading and practice underlying her
special statutory provisions.
It remains to be seen how the Supreme Court of Appeals
will treat the contact requirement in the Corporation Commission's approved endorsement3la and the contract obligations for notice to the insurer independent of service of process
and advice via the Department of Motor Vehicles. The ambit
of Va. Code 38.1-381(g) remains to be clarified in the contract
phase of litigation. The terminology of Chief Justice Eggleston's opinion in the Duncan case would incline this writer to the
position that the insured will be held to the approved contract
endorsement, and the phrase, "nor may anything be required of
the insured except the establishment of legal liability," will be
applied only to the matters of reports and claims, not to the
circumstances antecedent thereto.
The Hodgson case should resolve the question of procedure
requisite to maintaining a Virginia action to recover for damages incurred in an out-of-state accident in which a Virginia
insured becomes party plaintiff.
The other murky areas, pointed out primarily in early commentary on the law,32 such as the conflict of interest between
31

a See Appendix "E" for standard endorsement used to effect the coverage

required by the UML.
32

See 16 W. & L. L. R. 134, 135, 136, and 47 Va. L. R. 145, 166.
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insured and insurer appear to have been largely dissipated by
the recent decisions, particularly by the emphatic distinction
between contract and tort proceedings.
It is common practice for insurers, notified by the Division
of Motor Vehicles of potential accident claims by their insureds against uninsured operators, to send these uninsured to
good legal counsel. This cannot be considered a conflict of
interest. The insurer is under no obligation to assist his insured in winning a recovery. It would seem that the cause of
justice is advanced rather than hindered by firmly contesting
claims against financially irresponsible motorists. The strenuous curtailment of the privileges such parties have on the highways, if they do not remain judgment free, makes it important
to litigate fairly the initial tort claim rather than to enfeeble the
restrictions on offending drivers. We may be sure that, if the
restrictions against the financially pressed drivers become too
rigid, the whole program will be watered down politically, one
way or another. The present system has proven itself surprisingly effective and should not be modified significantly
without very careful consideration of all the ramifications of
upsetting the calculated balance of public and private interests,
of inducements and penalties, of administrative burden and of
personal privilege.
It would appear to the author that the courts should now be
receptive to the concept of a concurrent trial of tort and contract issues, at the option of the defendant insurer, should the
latter choose to intervene in his own name. Despite the prevailing fiction that the issue of insurance must not raise its ugly
head in tort litigation it is commonly recognized as a considerable factor by judges and jurors. It would certainly streamline
litigation to consider simultaneously the contract liability
where the defendant insurer so desires. To the knowledge
of the author, however, no intervenor insurer under the
statute has specifically identified itself as such; theinsurers have
merely attempted to argue their own case disguised as John
Doe. Now that the Brown case has disposed of this ruse, perhaps the insurers should come out of camouflage and engage
their adversary as such initially.
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APPENDIX "A"
CHAPTER 457
An Act to amend and reenact § 38.1-381, as amended, of the Code of
Virginia, relatingto policies or contracts of bodily injury liability
insurance or ofproperty damage liability insurance.
[H 311]

APPROVED MARCH 31, 1962

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:
1. That § 38.1-381, as amended, of the Code of Virginia be
amended and reenacted as follows:
§ 38.1-381. (a) No policy or contract of bodily injury
liability insurance, or of property damage liability insurance,
covering liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or
use of any motor vehicle, shall be issued or delivered in this
State to the owner of such vehicle, or shall be issued or delivered by any insurer licensed in this State upon any motor
vehicle then principally garaged or principally used in this
State, unless it contains a provision insuring the named insured
and any other person responsible for the use of or using the
motor vehicle with the consent, expressed or implied, of the
named insured, against liability for death or injury sustained,
or loss or damage occasioned within the coverage of the policy
or contract as a result of negligence in the operation or use of
such vehicle by the named insured or by any such person;
provided, that every automobile liability insurancepolicy or contract,
or endorsement thereto, insuringprivatepassenger automobilesprincipally garagedand/orused in Virginia, when the named insuredis an
individual or husband and wife, which includes, with respect to any
liability insuranceprovided by the policy, contract or endorsementfor
use of a non-owned automobile, any provision requiringpermission or
consent of the owner of such automobile in order that such insurance
apply, shall be construed to include permission or consent of the custodian in such provision requiringpermission or consent of the owner.
(b) Nor shall any such policy or contract be so issued or
delivered unless it contains an endorsement or provisions
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undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he shall be
legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, within limits which shall be
no less than the requirements of § 46.1-1(8), as amended from
time to time, of the Code herein. Such endorsement or provisions shall also provide for no less than five thousand dollars
coverage for injury to or destruction of the property of the insured in any one accident but may provide an exclusion of the
first two hundred dollars of such loss or damage.
(c) As used in this section, the term "bodily injury" shall
include death resulting therefrom; the term "insured" as used
in subsections (b), (d), (f), and (g) hereof, means the named
insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse
of any such named insured, and relatives of either, while in a
motor vehicle or otherwise, and any person who uses, with the
consent, expressed or implied, of the name insured, the motor
vehicle to which the policy applies and a guest in such motor
vehicle to which the policy applies or the personal representative of any of the above; and the term "uninsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle as to which there is no (i) bodily
injury liability insurance and property damage liability insurance both in the amounts specified by § 46.1-1 (8), as amended
from time to time, or (ii) there is such insurance but the insurance company writing the same denies coverage thereunder,
(iii) there is no bond or deposit of money or securities in lieu of
such bodily injury and property damage liability insurance and
(iv) the owner of such motor vehicle has not qualified as a selfinsurer under the provisions of § 46.1-395. A motor vehicle
shall be deemed to be uninsured if the owner or operator
thereof be unknown; provided that recovery under the endorsement or provisions shall be subject to the conditions hereinafter set forth.
(d) If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which
causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured be unknown, the insured or someone on his behalf, in order for the
insured to recover under the endorsement, shall report the
accident as required by § 46.1-400, unless such insured is
reasonably unable to do so, in which event the insured shall
make such report as soon as reasonably practicable under the
circumstances.
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(e) If the owner or operator of any vehicle causing injury
or damages be unknown, an action may be instituted against
the unknown defendant as "John Doe" and service of process
may be made by delivery of a copy of the motion for judgment
or other pleadings to the clerk of the court in which the action
is brought and service upon the insurance company issuing the
policy shall be made as prescribed by law as though such insurance company were a party defendant. The insurance company shall have the right to file pleadings and take other action
allowable by law in the name of John Doe.
(e) (1) Any insured intending to rely on the coverage
required by paragraph (b) of this section shall, if any action is
instituted against the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle, serve a copy of the process upon the insurance company
issuing the policy in the manner prescribed by law, as though
such insurance company were a party defendant; such company
shall thereafter have the right to file pleadings and take other
action allowable by law in the name of the owner or operator of
the uninsured motor vehicle or in its own name; provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph shall prevent such owner or
operator from employing counsel of his own choice and taking
any action in his own interest in connection with such proceeding.
This subsection shall not apply to any cause of action arising
prior to the effective date of this amendment.
(f) Any insurer paying a claim under the endorsement or
provisions required by paragraph (b) of this section shall be
subrogated to the rights of the insured to whom such claim was
paid against the person causing such injury, death or damage
to the extent that payment was made; provided that the
bringing of an action against the unknown owner or operator as
John Doe or the conclusion of such an action shall not constitute a bar to the insured, if the identity of the owner or operator
who caused the injury or damages complained of becomes
known, from bringing an action against the owner or operator
theretofore proceeded against as John Doe, provided that any
recovery against such owner or operator shall be paid to the
insurance company to the extent that such insurance company
paid the named insured in the action brought against such
owner or operator as John Doe, except that such insurance
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company shall pay its proportionate part of any reasonable
costs and expense incurred in connection therewith including
reasonable attorney's fees. Nothing in an endorsement or provisions made under this paragraph nor any other provision of
law shall operate to prevent the joining in an action against
John Doe of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle
causing such injury as a party defendant and such joinder is
hereby specifically authorized.
(g) No such endorsement or provisions shall contain any
provision requiring arbitration of any claim arising under such
endorsement or provisions, nor may anything be required of
the insured except the establishment of legal liability, nor shall
the insurer be restricted or prevented in any manner from employing legal counsel or instituting legal proceedings.
(h) The provisions of paragraph (a) and (b) of this section
shall not apply to any policy of insurance to the extent that it
covers the liability of an employer under any workmen's
compensation law, but no provision or application of this
section shall be construed to limit the liability of the insurance
company, insuring motor vehicles, to an employee or other
insured under this section who is injured by an uninsured
motor vehicle.
2. An emergency exists and this act is in force from its passage.
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APPENDIX "B"
CHAPTER 253
An Act to amend and reenact §§ 12-65, 12-66, 38.1-21 as amended,
and 38.1-252 of the Code of Virginia, the sections respectively
relating to supervision, control andpayments from the Uninsured
Motorists Fund; distribution to insurance companies; reduction in
rates applicableto the uninsuredmotorist endorsementandthedisposition of balance after payments to companies; definitions of motor
vehicle and aircraft insurance; and provisions governing the
making of rates, so as to provide that the rates chargedfor the
uninsured motorist endorsement shall be fixed as are the rates
chargedfor other motor vehicle insurance.
[S 2491

APPROVED MARCH 14,

1962

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:
1. That §§ 12-65, 12-66, 38.1-21, as amended, and 38.1-252 of
the Code of Virginia be amended and reeanacted as follows:
§ 12-65. The Uninsured Motorists Fund now or hereafter
provided for by law shall be under the supervision and control
of the State Corporation Commission and shall be paid out, on
warrants of the Comptroller issued on vouchers signed by such
person as the Commission shall designate, for the purpose of
reducing the costs of * motor vehicle liability insurance as defined
by § 38.1-21, as amended.
§ 12-66. The Commission shall annually, at such time in
each year as it may deem best for the purposes, make distribution from the Fund among the several insurance companies
writing motor vehicle bodily injury and property damage
liability insurance on motor vehicles registered in the State of
Virginia in the proportion that the premium income for the
basic limits coverage of each insurance company (that is, gross
premiums less cancellation and return premiums) for the
coverage required by paragraph (b) of § 38.1-381 of the Code of
Virginia bears to the total of such premium income for such
coverage written in the State during the preceding year. *The
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amount payable to any such insurance company hereunder shall
apply only to those companies maintaining records satisfactory
to the Commission as will disclose loss experience under such
endorsement.
§ 38.1-21. Motor vehicle and aircraft insurance means and
includes insurance against:
(1) Loss of or damage resulting from any cause to motor
vehicles which shall include trailers, or semitrailers or other
attachments designed for use in connection therewith, or aircraft and their equipment, and against legal liability of the insured for loss or damage to the property of another resulting
from the ownership, maintenance or use of motor vehicles or
aircraft and against loss, damage or expense incident to a claim
of such liability, and
(2) Legal liability of the insured, and liability arisingunder
paragraph(b) of§ 38.1-381 and against loss, damage, or expense
incident to a claim of such liability, arising out of the death or
injury of any person resulting from the ownership, maintenance
or use of motor vehicles or aircraft, but not including any kind
of insurance specified in § 38.1-17.
Any policy of motor vehicle and aircraft insurance covering
legal liability of the insured under paragraph (2) of this section
and liability arising under paragraph (b) of § 38.1-381 may
include appropriate provisions whereby the insuring company
assumes the obligation of payment of medical, hospital, surgical and funeral expenses arising out of the death or injury of any
person, and any such policy of motor vehicle insurance may
include appropriate provisions whereby the insuring company
assumes the obligation of payment of weekly indemnity or
other specific benefits to persons who are injured and specific
death benefits to dependents, beneficiaries or personal representatives of persons who are killed, if such injury or death is
caused by accident and sustained while in or upon, entering or
alighting from, or through being struck by a motor vehicle,
provided that such obligations are irrespective of any legal liability of the insured or any other person.
§ 38.1-252. Rates for the kinds of insurance to which this
chapter applies shall be made in accordance with the following
provisions:
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(1) Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly
discriminatory;
(2) As to the kinds of insurance to which Article 2 of this
chapter applies, and the kinds of insurance to which paragraphs (15), (16) and (17) of § 38.1-240 apply, including insurance against contingent, consequential and indirect losses
as defined in § 38.1-23, manual, minimum, class rates, rating
schedules or rating plans, shall be made and adopted, except
in the case of specific inland marine rates on risks specially
rated;

(3) Due consideration shall be given to past and prospective loss experience within and outside this State, to conflagration or catastrophe hazards, to a reasonable margin for underwriting profit and contingencies, to dividends, savings or
unabsorbed premium deposits allowed or returned by insurers
to their policyholders or members or subscribers, to past and
prospective expenses both countrywide and those specially
applicable to this State, and to all relevant factors within and
outside this State; and in the case of fire insurance rates consideration shall be given to the experience of the fire insurance
business during a period of not less than the most recent fiveyear period for which such experience is available and, in the
case of motor vehicle insurance as defined in § 38.1-21, consideration
shall be given to all sums distributed by the State Corporation Commission from the Uninsured Motorist Fund in accordance with the
provisions of §§ 12-65 and 12-66 to the companies writing motor
vehicle bodily injury liability andproperty damage liability insurance
on motor vehicles registeredin the State:
(4) As to the kinds of insurance to which paragraphs (1)
to (13), inclusive, of § 38.1-240 apply, including insurance
against contingent, consequential and indirect losses as defined
in § 38.1-23, (a) the systems of expense provisions included in
the rates for use by any insurer or group of insurers may differ
from those of other insurers or groups of insurers to reflect the
requirements of the operating methods of any such insurer or
group with respect to any kind of insurance, or with respect to
any subdivision or combination thereof for which subdivision
or combination separate expense provisions are applicable; and
(b) risks may be grouped by classifications for the establishment of rates and minimum premiums. Classification rates may
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be modified to produce rates for individual risks in accordance
with rating plans which establish standards for measuring variations in hazards or expense provisions, or both. Such standards
may measure any difference among risks that can be demonstrated to have a probable effect upon losses or expenses; and
(5) All such rates, rating schedules or rating plans and
every manual of classifications, rules and rates and every modification thereof, heretofore approved by the Commission,
shall be used until changed with the approval of the Commission.
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APPENDIX "E"
FAMILY PROTECTION AGAINST
UNINSURED MOTORISTS
BODILY INJURY LIABILITY AND PROPERTY
DAMAGE LIABILITY-VIRGINIA
This endorsement forms a part of
Policy Number

issued to

effective from
to
Schedule
Limits of Liability:
Bodily Injury-15,000 each person; $30,000 each accident
Property Damage-$5,000 each accident
In consideration of the payment of the premium for this endorsement, the company agrees with the named insured, subject
to the limits of liability, exclusions, conditions and other terms
of this endorsement and to the applicable terms of the policy:
Insuring Agreements
L Damagesfor Bodily Injury and Property Damage Caused by
UninsuredAutomobiles
To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of:
(a) bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death
resulting therefrom, hereinafter called "bodily
injury", sustained by the insured;
(b) injury to or destruction of (1) an automobile which
is registered in Virginia and which is owned by the
named insured or by his spouse if a resident of the
same household and (2) the contents of an insured
automobile, hereinafter called "property damage";
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caused by accident and arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile.
II. Definitions
(a) Insured. The unqualified word "insured" means
(1) the named insured and, while residents of the
same household, his spouse and the relatives of
either;
(2) any other person while occupying an insured
automobile; and
(3) any person, with respect to damages he is entided to recover for care or loss of services because of bodily injury to which this endorsement
applies.
The insurance applies separately with respect to each
insured under this endorsement, but neither this provision
nor application of the insurance to more than one insured
shall operate to increase the limits of the company's
liability.
(b) Insured Automobile. The term "insured automobile"
means:
(1) an automobile which is registered in Virginia and
which is owned by the named insured or by his
spouse if a resident of the same household;
(2) an automobile while temporarily used as a substitute for an insured automobile as described in
subparagraph (1) above, when withdrawn from
normal use because of its breakdown, repair,
servicing, loss or destruction; or
(3) any other automobile while being operated by
the named insured, or by his spouse if a resident
of the same household; but the term "insured
automobile" shall not include:
(i) under subparagraphs (1) and (2) above, an automobile unless being used by or with the permission of the named insured or his spouse if a resident of the same household; or
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(ii) under subparagraphs (2) and (3) above, an automobile owned by the named insured or by any
resident of the same household.
(c) Uninsured Automobile.
mobile" means:

The term "uninsured auto-

(i) an automobile with respect to the ownership,
maintenance or use of which there is, in the
amounts specified in the Virginia Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act, neither (i) cash or
securities on file with the Virginia Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles nor (ii) a bodily injury and
property damage liability bond or insurance
policy, applicable to the accident with respect to
any person or organization legally responsible
for the use of such automobile; or
(2) a hit-and-run automobile as defined; but the
term "uninsured automobile" shall not include:
(i) an automobile defined herein as an "insured
automobile";
(ii) an automobile owned by the named insured or
by any resident of the same household;
(iii) an automobile which is owned or operated by a
self-insurer within the meaning of any motor vehide financial responsibility law, motor carrier
law or any similar law;
(iv) an automobile which is owned by the United
States of America, Canada, a state, a political subdivision of any such government or an agency of
any of the foregoing;
(v) a land motor vehicle or trailer, if operated on rails
or crawler-treads or while located for use as a
residence or premises and not as a vehicle; or
(vi) a farm type tractor or equipment designed for use
principally off public roads, except while actually
upon public roads.
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(d) Hit-and-Run Automobile. The term "hit and-run automobile" means an automobile which causes bodily
injury to an insured or property damage arising out of
physical contact of such automobile (1) with the insured or (2) with an insured automobile, provided: (i)
there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the
operator or the owner of such "hit-and-run automobile"; (ii) the insured or someone on his behalf shall
have reported the accident within 5 days or as soon as
practicable to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
and shall have filed with the company within 30 days
thereafter a statement under oath that the insured or
his legal representative has a cause or causes of action
arising out of such accident for damages against a
person or persons whose identity is unascertainable,
and setting forth the facts in support thereof; and (iii)
at the company's request, the insured or his legal
representative makes available for inspection the
automobile which the insured was occupying at the
time of the accident.
(e) Occupying. The word "occupying" means in or upon
or entering into or alighting from.
(f) State. The word "state" includes the District of Columbia, a territory or possession of the United States,
and a province of Canada.
III. Policy Period,Territory
This endorsement applies only to accidents which occur
on and after the effective date hereof, during the policy
period and within the United States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada.
Exclusions
This endorsement does not apply:
(a) to the first two hundred dollars of the total amount of
all property damage as the result of any one accident;
(b) to bodily injury to an insured, care or loss of services
recoverable by an insured or injury to or destruction of
property of an insured, with respect to which such in-
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sured or his legal representative shall, without written
consent of the company, make any settlement with
any person or organization who may be legally liable
therefor;
(c) so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of
any workmen's compensation or disability benefits
carrier or any person or organization qualifying as a
self-insurer under any workmen's compensation or
disability benefits law or any similar law.
Conditions
1. Policy Provisions. None of the Insuring Agreements, Exclusions, Conditions or Other Provisions of the policy shall apply
to the insurance afforded by this endorsement except the Conditions "Notice" or "Notice of Accident," "Subrogation,"
"Changes," "Assignment," "Cancellation" and "Declarations".
2. Premiums. If during the policy period the number of automobiles owned by the named insured or spouse and registered
in Virginia or the number of Virginia dealer's license plates
issued to the named insured changes, the named insured shall
notify the company during the policy period of any change and
the premium shall be adjusted in accordance with the manuals
in use by the company. If the earned premium thus computed
exceeds the advance premium paid, the named insured shall pay
the excess to the company; if less, the company shall return to
the named insured the unearned portion paid by such insured.
3. Proof of Claim. As soon as practicable, the insured or other
person making claim shall give to the company writtten proof
of claim, under oath if required, including full particulars of the
nature and extent of the injuries, treatment, and other details
entering into the determination of the amount payable hereunder. Proof of claim shall be made upon forms furnished by
the company unless the company shall have failed to furnish
such forms within 15 days after receiving notice of claim.
The injured person shall submit to physical examinations
by physicians selected by the company when and as the company may reasonably require and he, or in the event of his incapacity his legal representative, or in the event of his death his
legal representative or the person or persons entitled to sue
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therefor, shall upon each request from the company execute
authorization to enable the company to obtain medical reports
and copies of records.
The insured or other person making claim for damage to
property shall file proof of loss with the company within sixty
days after the occurrence of loss, unless such time is extended
in writing by the company, in the form of a sworn statement
setting forth the interest of the insured and of all others in the
property affected, any encumbrances thereon, the actual cash
value thereof at time of loss, the amount, place, time and
cause of such loss, and the description and amounts of all other
insurance covering such property. Upon the company's request, the insured shall exhibit the damaged property to the
company.
4. Notice of Legal Action. If, before the company makes payment of loss hereunder, the insured or his legal representative
shall institute any legal action for bodily injury or property
damage against any person or organization legally responsible
for the use of an automobile involved in the accident, a copy of
the summons and complaint or other process served in connection with such legal action shall be forwarded immediately to
the company by the insured or his legal representative.
5. Limits of Liability. (a) The limit of bodily injury liability
stated in the schedule as applicable to "each person" is the
limit of the company's liability for all damages, including
damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injury
sustained by one person as the result of any one accident and,
subject to the above provision respecting each person, the limit
of such liability stated in the schedule as applicable to "each
accident" is the total limit of the company's liability for all
damages, including damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the
result of any one accident.
(b) The limit of property damage liability stated in the
schedule as applicable to "each accident" is the total limit of
the company's liability for all damages arising out of injury to
or destruction of all property of one or more insureds as the
result of any one accident.
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(c) If claim is made under this endorsement and claim is also
made against any person who is an insured under the Bodily
Injury Liability or Property Damage Liability coverages of the
policy because of bodily injury or property damage sustained in
an accident by a person who is an insured under this endorsement:
(1)

any payment made under this endorsement to or for
any such person shall be applied in reduction of any
amount which he may be entitled to recover from any
person who is an insured under the Bodily Injury
Liability or Property Damage Liability coverages; and

(2)

any payment made under the Bodily Injury Liability
or Property Damage Liability coverages to or for any
such person shall be applied in reduction of any
amount which he may be entitled to recover under
this endorsement.

(d) Any amount payable to an insured under the terms of this
endorsement shall be reduced by (1) all sums paid to such insured for bodily injury or property damage by or on behalf of
the person legally liable therefor and (2) the amount paid and
the present value of all amounts payable to such an insured
under any workmen's compensation law, exclusive of nonoccupational disability benefits.
6. Other Insurance. With respect to bodily injury to an insured
while occupying an automobile not owned by the named insured under this endorsement, the insurance hereunder shall
apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance
available to such occupant, and this insurance shall then apply
only in the amount by which the applicable limit of liability of
this endorsement exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of
liability of all such other insurance.
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying or through being struck by an uninsured automobile, if
such insured is a named insured under other similar insurance
available to him, then the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the company shall not be
liable under this endorsement for a greater proportion of the
applicable limit of liability of this endorsement than such limit
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bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance.
With respect to bodily injury to an insured and subject to
the foregoing paragraphs, if the insured has other similar insurance available to him against a loss covered by this endorsement, the company shall not be liable under this endorsement
for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable limit
of liability hereunder bears to the total applicable limits of
liability of all valid and collectible insurance against such loss.
With respect to property damage, the insurance afforded
under this endorsement shall be excess insurance over any
other valid and collectible insurance against such property
damage.
7. Payment of Loss by the Company. Any amount due hereunder
is payable to the insured or his legal representative.
8. Action Against Company. No action shall lie against the
company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, the insured
or his legal representative has fully complied with all the terms
of this endorsement.

